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Non–technical Summary
The series of Hartz reforms currently being implemented primarily intends to
reduce the duration of unemployment in Germany. As a result of these reforms,
the German unemployment compensation system is experiencing significant changes
between 2002 and 2006. Some of the changes are simply withdrawals of reforms that
were enacted during recent decades. A detailed investigation of past reforms using
recent estimation techniques and comprehensive register based data may therefore
yield interesting insights into possible outcomes of future labour market reforms.
This paper pre-investigates the reduction in maximum entitlement periods for
unemployment benefits that will come into force in 2006, which basically withdraws
a reform of the mid- 1980s. The latter has already been analysed in many contri-
butions. However, empirical findings regarding the effect on job search periods of
the unemployed are still controversial. Further research is necessary (Biewen and
Wilke, 2005). The only noncontroversial finding to date is that extension in max-
imum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits was creating the conditions
for massive early retirement at the expense of the unemployment insurance sys-
tem. Both employers and older employees agreed to early retirement packages, thus
negating the greater dismissal protection for the older employees with long-term
company affiliation. This typical win-win situation and additional costs due to the
high unemployment in East Germany generated an enormous burden for the social
security systems in Germany, which are nowadays close to collapse. The results
of Kyyra¨ and Wilke (2004) for Finland suggest that the future reform in 2006 will
effectively reduce this kind of early retirement in Germany.
By analyzing the reform of the mid- 1980s we restrict our analysis in this study
to the possible effects of the future reform on the 44-48 age group in order to exclude
from our sample most of those who took early retirement. We are using the 36-41 age
group as the control group. We use extensive administrative data with the drawback
that there are unobserved periods in the individual employment trajectories which
may coincide with either unemployment or with employment. Hence, periods of
registered unemployment are not directly observed and results of the econometric
analysis may depend on the chosen definition of unemployment in the data. In order
to get robust results with respect to the definition of unemployment we bound the
reform effect on unemployment duration over different definitions of unemployment.
By exploiting the richness of the data we use a nonparametric approach without
imposing critical parametric model assumptions. We identify a systematic increase
in unemployment duration in response to the reform, i.e. a significant increase
between months 12 and 22, for married males with high pre-unemployment earnings
and weakly for unmarried females. These samples amount to less than 15% of the
unemployment spells for the treatment group. The identifiable effect of the future
reform is therefore expected to be small for the full population. We also do not
observe a general worsening of the labour market conditions for those in the 44-
48 age group since the unemployment durations did not uniformly elongate in all
cells of the population. In several data cells we identify a general increase in the
highest quantiles of the unemployment duration distribution, i.e. after two years of
unemployment and later. This rise in the length of very long-term unemployment
(after several years) or equivalently the increase in the proportion of the unemployed,
who never exit to employment again, is likely to make a substantial contribution to
the increase in the unemployment rate for this group but this was not the subject
of detailed investigation in this paper. Moreover, for the group aged 44-48 we do
not identify a systematic change in lay-off behaviour of firms after the reform, as is
known for the individuals aged 50 and above.
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Abstract
Economic theory suggests that an extension of the maximum length of en-
titlement for unemployment benefits increases the duration of unemployment.
Empirical results for the reform of the unemployment compensation system
in Germany during the 1980s are less clear. The analysis in this paper is mo-
tivated by the controversial empirical findings and by recent developments in
econometrics for partial identification. We use extensive administrative data
with the drawback that registered unemployment is not directly observed.
For this reason we bound the reform effect on unemployment duration over
different definitions of unemployment. By exploiting the richness of the data
we use a nonparametric approach without imposing critical parametric model
assumptions. We identify a systematic increase in unemployment duration
in response to the reform in samples that amount to less than 15% of the
unemployment spells for the treatment group.
Keywords: unemployment duration, definition of unemployment, nonpara-
metric bounds analysis, (quantile-) treatment effect
JEL: C14, C41, J64, J65
1 Introduction
Many empirical contributions consider the question whether unemployment dura-
tions increase with the entitlement length for unemployment benefits. This is sug-
gested by economic theory which also predicts an increase with the level of the
unemployment compensation. See Katz and Meyer (1990) for a summary. Some
empirical evidence for that is observed for the US (Katz and Meyer, 1990) and for
the UK (van den Berg, 1990).
In Germany the maximum entitlement length for unemployment benefits for the
older employees was increased during the 1980s. This paper pre-investigates the re-
duction in maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits that will come
into force in 2006, which basically withdraws the former reform. The reform of
the 1980s is therefore highly relevant for possible outcomes of recent labour market
reforms in Germany. It presents a unique opportunity to identify the effect of an
increase in the maximum entitlement length in a natural experiment set-up since
it only affects some groups (42 years old and older) of the population. It was al-
ready subject to several empirical investigations, see Biewen and Wilke (2005) for a
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summary. However, the only noncontroversial finding to date is that it was creating
the conditions for massive early retirement at the expense of the unemployment
insurance system. Both employers and older employees agreed to early retirement
packages, thus negating the greater dismissal protection for older employees with
long-term company affiliation. This typical win-win situation (Fitzenberger and
Wilke, 2004) and additional costs due to the high unemployment in East Germany
generated an enormous burden for the social security systems in Germany, which
are nowadays close to collapse. However, the results are less clear when one focuses
on the group of older unemployed who have not taken early retirement, i.e. who
are still looking for new jobs. Empirical studies using household panel survey data
do not have conclusive findings. Schneider and Hujer (1997) do not find increases
in unemployment duration, whereas Hunt (1995) and Hujer and Schneider (1995)
report such increases for some age groups. Using register data, Plaßmann (2002)
finds strong effects but she ignores the early retirement issue. Fitzenberger and
Wilke (2004) obtain rather different results for two definitions of unemployment. In
particular using nonparametric techniques they find that unemployment duration
of those who enter employment again seem not increase in response to the reform.
Biewen and Wilke (2005) apply a series of semiparametric single-spell duration mod-
els to the same data and they identify an increase in unemployment duration for
males aged under 49 but it remains unclear whether this is in response to the reform
or due to changes in labour market conditions. For females they do not observe an
increase at all. They conclude that further research is necessary.
The analysis in this paper is motivated by these controversial findings and by
recent developments in econometrics for partial identification. The purpose of this
paper is to revisit the analysis of the above mentioned papers by bounding the effect
of the reform of the unemployment compensation system over different definitions
of unemployment. We aim to gain robust insights into the extent to which the con-
ducted reform in West Germany has increased unemployment spells by exploiting
the extreme richness of the register-based data. In particular, we use a nonparamet-
ric approach in order to bound the reform effect on unemployment duration over
different definitions of unemployment without imposing critical parametric model
assumptions such as the proportionality of hazard rates. We identify a systematic
increase in unemployment duration in response to the reform in samples that amount
to less than 15% of the unemployment spells for the treatment group.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the
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reform and data. Section 3 describes our estimation strategy and Section 4 discusses
our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Institutions
A comprehensive summary of the changes in the German unemployment compensa-
tion system can be found in Hunt (1995) and Plaßmann (2002). Details are there-
fore not presented here. For our estimations we use the IAB employment subsample
(IABS) 1975-1997 which contains daily information about employment periods of
about 500K individuals in West Germany. The data is a representative 1% sample
of the socially insured workforce in Germany. For a general description of the data
see Bender et. al (2000). A general advantage of this data is the large sample size
and the daily register-based records which are assumed to be more precise than
household interview- based data. A disadvantage of the IABS is the small number
of observed variables and the missing information about registered unemployment,
since only information about the receipt of unemployment compensation from the
German federal labour office is observed. Until 2004 these were unemployment ben-
efits (UB, Arbeitslosengeld)1, unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosenhilfe)2 or
income maintenance during further training (IMT, Unterhaltsgeld). For this reason
Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) proxy unemployment with two definitions. They
introduce the nonemployment (NE) proxy as an upper bound for the unemploy-
ment duration and the unemployment between jobs (UBJ) proxy as a lower bound.
In their analysis it is evident that the results strongly depend on the definition of
unemployment.
The analysis in this paper intends to bound the effect of the reform of the unem-
ployment compensation system over the proxies of unemployment that are extracted
from the data. For this purpose we use the NE proxy of Fitzenberger and Wilke
(2004) as the upper bound:
• Nonemployment (NE): all periods of nonemployment after an employment
period which contain at least one period with income transfers by the German
federal labour office. The nonemployment period is considered as censored if
the last record involves a UB, UA, or IMT payment that is not followed by an
1Hunt (1995) refers to this as unemployment insurance (ALG).
2Hunt (1995) uses the abbreviation ALH.
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employment spell.3
In this case we do not know whether the individual is still unemployed, out of
the labour force or maybe self-employed. With this definition of unemployment we
include the periods of nonemployment (out of the labour force, social benefits) which
are not explicitly recorded in the data. This seems to be a natural approach since we
cannot distinguish unemployment spells from periods of out of the labour market.
It is therefore an upward biased proxy of the true unemployment duration. On the
contrary we consider two proxies for the lower bound of unemployment duration:
UBJ and UPIT, which are as follows:
• Unemployment between jobs (UBJ): all periods of nonemployment be-
tween two employment spells if there is a permanent flow of UB, UA, or IMT
payments. Interruptions of these payments can be up to four weeks – in the
case of cut–off times4: six weeks. With this definition it is ensured that the in-
dividuals are continuously registered as unemployed. Note that in this sample
many registered unemployed, who never exit again to employment, have an
UBJ duration of length of 0. This is often the case for long term unemployed.
• Unemployment with permanent income transfers (UPIT): all periods
of nonemployment after an employment period with a continuous flow of un-
employment compensation from the German federal labour office. Maximum
interruption in compensation transfers is one month – in the case of cut–off
times: six weeks. An observation is marked as right censored at the last day of
the duration before the transfers are interrupted for more than one month or
in the event of there being no observation after the last compensation transfer.
We introduce the UPIT proxy because the UBJ proxy may be too narrow for our
purposes. This is mainly because the latter conditions on the future exit to em-
ployment. This is a valuable property for the identification of the increase in early
retirement as undertaken by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) but in our analysis we
may lose too much information, in particular for all individuals who do not enter
3A nonemployment spell is treated as right censored if it is not fully observed.
4Cut-off times sanction unemployed who have quit a job voluntarily, who reject acceptable job
offers, who abort training measures or who do not comply with other regular responsibilities. For
more details and empirical evidence about sanctions for the unemployed in West Germany see
Wilke (2004).
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employment any more. This may prevent us from obtaining tight bounds for the
treatment effect. In any case we have UBJ ≤ UPIT ≤ NE.
Figure 1 presents three common samples of the data structure. In case A all
proxies yield the same length for the unemployment duration: t2 − t0. In case B we
obtain UBJ = 0, UPIT = t1 − t0 (right censored) and NE = t2 − t0 if the length
of the non observed period is greater than one month otherwise we obtain case A.
In case C we have UBJ = 0 and UPIT = NE = t1 − t0 (right censored).
time
Employment Employment
time
Employment Employment
time
Employment
t_0
t_0
t_0
t_1 t_2
t_2
t_1
UC
UC N/A
UC N/A
UC: income transfers from the
employment office
N/A: non observed
A
C
B
Figure 1: Three common examples of the data structure.
There is another important difference between the construction of our samples
and the samples used in Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004). The latter extract samples
of different size for their estimations. Their estimates may therefore be affected
by sample selection issues. We make provision for that by comparing exactly the
same samples. By construction UBJ and UPIT durations are less or equal to NE
durations. In some cases a NE duration is not included in the UBJ and/or the UPIT
sample. These observations are then added to UBJ and/or UPIT as a non censored
zero duration. This corresponds to an observed zero length unemployment duration
which is the natural lower bound. This implies that there exists a UBJ and UPIT
duration for any NE duration.
In Germany, socially insured employees with a sufficient amount of working ex-
perience are entitled to unemployment benefits.5 The length of the entitlement
period depends on the length of the employment periods before the beginning of
5See Hunt (1995) for more details.
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the unemployment period and on the age of the unemployed person. The maximum
entitlement length for unemployment benefits was increased during the years 1985-
1987. See table 1 in Hunt (1995) for an overview. For our analysis we classify the
calendar years 1981-1988 into three categories:
• pre reform period: 1981-1983
• reform period: 1984-1986
• post reform period: 1987-1988
1984 is considered as a reform year because unemployment spells starting in 1983 are
the latest not affected at all by the reform. The entitlement length in many spells
starting in 1984 were extended in 1985 after the reform came into force. Anticipation
behaviour in 1984 may also affect our estimation results. Years before 1981 are not
considered because of data quality issues6. As post reform years we use 1987 - 1988
(2 years). 1987 is included because the post reform system already applies to most
of the unemployment spells starting in 1987. Years after 1988 are not considered
because of the systematic changes in labour market conditions during and after
German unification.7
It is also important to note that the extension of the maximum entitlement
lengths has different implications for the unemployed depending on the levels of in-
come transfers during the unemployment duration. The wage replacement rate for
unemployment benefits (unemployment assistance) depends on previous earnings.8
Unemployed persons with low pre-unemployment income may therefore obtain social
benefits as additional income transfers. This is the case if income transfers from the
employment offices are not high enough to cover the basic needs of the household.
Households (and not individuals) are eligible for social benefits which are means
tested and the level depends mainly on the community and on the demographic
structure of the household. Any form of welfare support is paid by the communi-
ties and it is not observable in the data. If transfers from the employment office
plus other household income is below this level the household is entitled to welfare
6The information on transfer payments seems to be incomplete in the data, see Bender et al.
(1996) for details.
7We did estimations for different sets of post reform years until 1994. Figures are available on
request.
8In addition, unemployment assistance is means tested, i.e. it decreases with the income gen-
erated by other household members and in some cases it depends on expected earnings.
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Figure 2: The level of income transfers in Germany is never below the welfare level:
example for high (left) and low (right) pre-unemployment wages (where there are
children involved).
support. The reform should therefore have a smaller effect on those with low pre-
unemployment earnings because an increase in unemployment compensation would
simultaneously decrease the level of additional social benefits resulting in a zero or
very small net change. See figure 2 (right). Since we do not observe any receipt of
welfare in the data, we can only try to make provision for that by using the level
of pre-unemployment income. The same reasoning applies to individuals with high
former income levels. See figure 2 (left). We may expect stronger reform effects
for this group. The reform under consideration therefore implies a weak increase of
the unemployment compensation level after twelve months unemployment duration.
Unfortunately, we do not observe the level of unemployment compensation paid by
the employment offices which leaves us the pre-unemployment earnings and the type
of income transfers from the employment offices as the only observable determinants
for the wage replacement rate.9 For this reason we construct dummy variables in-
dicating whether the pre-unemployment wage is located in the bottom (top) three
(two) quintiles of the IABS population income distribution of full time employees
in the year when the unemployment spells begins. The bottom (top) quintiles are
9The wage replacement rate also depends on whether the claimant has dependent children.
Information about children is unreliable in the data and not available at all before 1983. For this
reason we decided to ignore it in the analysis.
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referred to as low (high) pre-unemployment earnings in this paper.
We use individuals aged 36-41 as the control group in our analysis. These are the
oldest individuals not affected by the reform. We select the individuals aged 44-48
as the treatment group. This is done for the following reasons: those aged 42-43 are
excluded because the short extension of the maximum entitlement length implies a
weak treatment for this group. Aged >48 are not considered because Fitzenberger
and Wilke (2004) find there is already some evidence that early retirement starts
within the age group 49-53 and we want to focus our analysis on individuals still
looking for jobs. During the reform under consideration the maximum entitlement
length for unemployment benefits increased from 12 to 22 months for the treatment
group, whereby it remained constant for the control group.
For our empirical analysis we construct a sample of unemployment periods that
is homogenous with respect to the work history of the individuals10 in order to
reduce sample selection issues at the inflow level to unemployment and to reduce
the degree of unobserved components that may affect our nonparametric results.
In addition the sample is chosen such that the individuals have long entitlement
periods for unemployment benefits. In particular we restrict our sample to:11
• periods with unemployment benefits as first income transfer
• no receipt of any unemployment transfer during the past 12 months before the
current unemployment period
• no recall to the former employer after the last unemployment period
• the business sector of “agriculture” is excluded (last employment)
We do not observe the maximum entitlement length for unemployment benefits in
the data and a construction of such a variable is laborious. For this reason we use the
simple rule that the unemployed did not receive any unemployment compensation
within the year prior to unemployment. This does not ensure that the unemployed
persons actually do have maximum entitlement for unemployment compensation but
we found that the median length of employment before unemployment is in the range
10Using censored quantile regressions, Lu¨demann et al. (2004) observe that work history variables
have a strong explanatory degree for the length of unemployment duration in West Germany.
11We do not impose restrictions on the educational degree because in our analysis we find similar
results for educational groups. For this reason we use a pooled sample.
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of three years. This would imply a median entitlement length of about 18 months for
the treatment group. The inclusion of individuals with shorter entitlement lengths
results in a downward bias of the reform effect and at the same time the importance
of the reform decreases since even fewer individuals get the maximum treatment.
Tables 1 and 2 present the summary statistics for the pre and post reform samples.
In total we have 9, 631 unemployment spells in our sample of which 6, 566 (68%) are
recorded during the pre reform period. By definition the length of UBJ is shortest
and the length of NE is longest. We observe that the average length of UPIT spells
is about twice the length of UBJ and average NE length is about twice UPIT.
We observe that median length of UBJ has decreased in the post reform years,
UPIT remained almost unchanged whereby the median for NE duration increased,
in particular for the treatment population. Interestingly, the median UBJ spell
length for the treatment group in the post reform years is close to zero. This means
that almost 50% of the unemployment spells do not meet the requirement for UBJ.
For this reason we cannot expect high identification power by using UBJ. Just by
looking at these crude numbers one may expect that the reform effect possibly varies
across the unemployment proxies which motivates our analysis.
3 Econometric Framework
This section describes an econometric approach used in the paper. Our framework
is based on bounds analysis (see a monograph by Manski (2003) for a review). In
particular, we present bounds for treatment effects in the context of difference-in-
differences. We also obtain tighter bounds using some plausible independence and
monotonicity assumptions.12 There are no new ideas in our econometric framework;
however, details of bounds analysis are newly developed to analyse difference-in-
differences-type treatment effects under a natural experiment.13
To describe our econometric model, assume that we observe interval data on the
duration variable of interest, say Y . That is, we observe Y1 and Y2, where Y1 ≤ Y2,
and it is only known that latent duration Y is between Y1 and Y2. For example, if
12See, for example, Manski and Pepper (2000) and Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir
(2004) for implications of imposing some credible assumptions.
13See Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2004) for an application of bounds analysis to duration analysis
in the context of competing risks models. See also Manski (1990, 1997) and Lechner (1999) for
nonparametric bounds of treatment effects.
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Y1 = Y2, then observed duration is a point and equal to Y ; however, in general, we
have Y1 < Y2, then Y is in the interval between Y1 and Y2. In our application, Y is
the unemployment spell, Y1 is either UBJ or UPIT, and Y2 is NE.
We consider two types of treatment effects, one on the survival probability of
Y and the other on the quantiles of Y conditional on explanatory variables X.
For simplicity, we assume that X is a vector of discrete random variables. Both
treatment effects are defined as difference-in-differences (DID) in terms of survival
probability and quantiles, respectively. It is plausible that the DID estimates can
be regarded as treatment effects since the reform we consider can be thought of as
a natural experiment.
First, we present bounds for the treatment effects in terms of survival probability.
To do so, let P denote time periods pt0 and pt1 (before and after a treatment) and
T denote age groups 0 and 1 (control and treatment groups). In our application,
pt0 = 1981, 1982, 1983 and pt1 = 1987, 1988. Also, age group 0 consists of individuals
aged 36-41 and age group 1 is composed of individuals aged 44-48. We define the
effect of a reform to be
∆(y|x, pt0, pt1) = [S(y|1, pt1, x)− S(y|0, pt1, x)]− [S(y|1, pt0, x)− S(y|0, pt0, x)],
(1)
where S(y|t, p, x) = P (Y > y|T = t, P = p,X = x). If Y were observed, then the
treatment effect could be estimated by a sample analogue to (1). Obviously, this is
infeasible since we have only interval data on Y . A natural approach is to bound
∆(y|x, pt0, pt1) by combining bounds for four survival probabilities.
Define S1(y|t, p, x) = P (Y1 > y|T = t, P = p,X = x), and S2(y|t, p, x) =
P (Y2 > y|T = t, P = p,X = x). Without imposing additional conditions, then the
identification region for S(y|t, p, x) is
S1(y|t, p, x) ≤ S(y|t, p, x) ≤ S2(y|t, p, x) (2)
for t = 0, 1 and p = pt0, pt1. This is a worst case bound for S(y|t, p, x). Since there
are no cross restrictions over time periods and age groups, equation (2) implies that
S1(y|1, pt1, x)− S2(y|0, pt1, x) ≤ S(y|1, pt1, x)− S(y|0, pt1, x)
≤ S2(y|1, pt1, x)− S1(y|0, pt1, x)
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and
S1(y|1, pt0, x)− S2(y|0, pt0, x) ≤ S(y|1, pt0, x)− S(y|0, pt0, x)
≤ S2(y|1, pt0, x)− S1(y|0, pt0, x),
which, in turn, implies that ∆(y|x, pt0, pt1) is bounded by an interval with endpoints
[l(y|x, pt0, pt1), u(y|x, pt0, pt1)]:
l(y|x, pt0, pt1) = max[−1, {S1(y|1, pt1, x)− S2(y|0, pt1, x)}
− {S2(y|1, pt0, x)− S1(y|0, pt0, x)}] (3)
and
u(y|x, pt0, pt1) = min[1, {S2(y|1, pt1, x)− S1(y|0, pt1, x)}
− {S1(y|1, pt0, x)− S2(y|0, pt0, x)}]. (4)
Note that the lower and upper bounds are restricted to be between -1 and 1. This is
due to the fact that maximum variation of the survival probability cannot be larger
than 1 in absolute values. If this interval is shorter than [−1, 1], there is identifying
power. In particular, if the lower bound is greater than zero or the upper bound is
smaller than zero, then one can identify signs of the effect.
Sample analogue estimation of these bounds is straightforward. In most cases, Y1
and Y2 may be censored. To deal with this, we assume that Y1 and Y2 are censored
independently given (T, P,X) = (t, p, x). Then S1(y|t, p, x) and S2(y|t, p, x) can
be estimated consistently by Kaplan-Meier estimators conditional on (T, P,X) =
(t, p, x). Therefore, we estimate l(y|x, pt0, pt1) and u(y|x, pt0, pt1) using the following
sample analogues:
lˆ(y|x, pt0, pt1) = max[−1, {Sˆ1(y|1, pt1, x)− Sˆ2(y|0, pt1, x)}
− {Sˆ2(y|1, pt0, x)− Sˆ1(y|0, pt0, x)}] (5)
and
uˆ(y|x, pt0, pt1) = min[1, {Sˆ2(y|1, pt1, x)− Sˆ1(y|0, pt1, x)}
− {Sˆ1(y|1, pt0, x)− Sˆ2(y|0, pt0, x)}], (6)
where Sˆ1(y|t, p, x) and Sˆ2(y|t, p, x) are Kaplan-Meier estimators of S1(y|t, p, x) and
S2(y|t, p, x) conditional on (T, P,X) = (t, p, x).
The lower and upper bounds in (3) and (4) are obtained by applying a few as-
sumptions; however, these may not be very informative in some cases. It would
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be useful to compare these bounds with those obtained by imposing more restric-
tions. In particular, we obtain tighter bounds using some plausible independence and
monotonicity assumptions. The first assumption we explore is that the treatment ef-
fect ∆(y|x, pt0, pt1) is not a function of pt0 and pt1. That is, ∆(y|x, pt0, pt1) = ∆(y|x).
This independence assumption is palatable since time effects cancel out for the DID
estimates.14 Under this additional assumption, the lower and upper bounds can be
tightened:
lˆ(y|x) = max
pt0,pt1
lˆ(y|x, pt0, pt1) (7)
and
uˆ(y|x) = min
pt0,pt1
uˆ(y|x, pt0, pt1), (8)
where max and min are taken over all possible combinations of pt0 and pt1.
The second assumption we consider is that S(y|0, p, x) ≤ S(y|1, p, x) for all p
and x. Roughly speaking, this means that the durations for young workers tend to
be shorter than for old workers where other things are equal. This is reasonable in
our application since young workers may be more mobile than old workers. Under
this additional assumption,
max{0, S1(y|1, pt1, x)− S2(y|0, pt1, x)} ≤ S(y|1, pt1, x)− S(y|0, pt1, x)
≤ S2(y|1, pt1, x)− S1(y|0, pt1, x)
and
max{0, S1(y|1, pt0, x)− S2(y|0, pt0, x)} ≤ S(y|1, pt0, x)− S(y|0, pt0, x)
≤ S2(y|1, pt0, x)− S1(y|0, pt0, x).
This implies that ∆(y|x, pt0, pt1) is bounded by an interval with endpoints:
l˜(y|x, pt0, pt1) = max[−1,max{0, S1(y|1, pt1, x)− S2(y|0, pt1, x)}
− {S2(y|1, pt0, x)− S1(y|0, pt0, x)}]
and
u˜(y|x, pt0, pt1) = min[1, {S2(y|1, pt1, x)− S1(y|0, pt1, x)}
−max{0, S1(y|1, pt0, x)− S2(y|0, pt0, x)}].
14Of course, only separable time effects cancel out. If there were any nonseparable time effects,
then our estimates could be biased estimates for ‘true’ treatment effects.
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The first and second assumptions can be imposed together to yield tighter bounds.
They are:
l˜(y|x) = max
pt0,pt1
l˜(y|x, pt0, pt1) (9)
and
u˜(y|x) = min
pt0,pt1
u˜(y|x, pt0, pt1), (10)
where max and min take over all possible combinations of pt0 and pt1.
Now we present bounds for the treatment effects in terms of conditional quantiles.
Notice that (2) can be rewritten in terms of conditional quantile functions:
Q1(τ |t, p, x) ≤ Q(τ |t, p, x) ≤ Q2(τ |t, p, x), (11)
where Q(τ |t, p, x) is the τ -th quantile of Y conditional on (T, P,X) = (t, p, x) and
Qj(τ |t, p, x) is the τ -th quantile of Yj conditional on (T, P,X) = (t, p, x) for j =
1, 2. Again invoking difference-in-differences strategy to identify quantile treatment
effects,15 we define the τ -th quantile DID treatment effect to be
∆Q(τ |x, pt0, pt1) = [Q(τ |1, pt1, x)−Q(τ |0, pt1, x)]− [Q(τ |1, pt0, x)−Q(τ |0, pt0, x)].
As before, we obtain lower and upper bounds for ∆Q(τ |x, pt0, pt1):
lQ(τ |x, pt0, pt1) = [Q1(τ |1, pt1, x)−Q2(τ |0, pt1, x)]− [Q2(τ |1, pt0, x)−Q1(τ |0, pt0, x)]
and
uQ(τ |x, pt0, pt1) = [Q2(τ |1, pt1, x)−Q1(τ |0, pt1, x)]− [Q1(τ |1, pt0, x)−Q2(τ |0, pt0, x)].
Again, these bounds can be estimated by sample analogues.16 Furthermore, the
bounds can be tightened using similar independence and monotonicity assumptions.
If we assume that Q(τ |0, p, x) ≤ Q(τ |1, p, x)17 and that the quantile treatment effect
is not a function of pt0 and pt1, then for each τ , the lower and upper bounds for the
15See, for example, Athey and Imbens (2002) for the DID method in nonlinear settings.
16When Y1 and Y2 are censored, conditional quantiles can be estimated by inverting the Kaplan-
Meier estimators of the conditional distributions of Y1 and Y2 conditional on (T, P,X) = (t, p, x).
It is possible that some of the upper quantiles may not be identified.
17Note that if this assumption holds for each τ , then that is equivalent to the previous assumption
that S(y|0, p, x) ≤ S(y|1, p, x) for all y, p and x.
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quantile treatment effect ∆Q(τ |x) are given by
lQ(τ |x) = max
pt0,pt1
l˜Q(τ |x, pt0, pt1)
and
uQ(τ |x) = max
pt0,pt1
u˜Q(τ |x, pt0, pt1),
where
l˜Q(τ |x, pt0, pt1) = max[0, Q1(τ |1, pt1, x)−Q2(τ |0, pt1, x)]− [Q2(τ |1, pt0, x)−Q1(τ |0, pt0, x)]
and
u˜Q(τ |x, pt0, pt1) = [Q2(τ |1, pt1, x)−Q1(τ |0, pt1, x)]−max[0, Q1(τ |1, pt0, x)−Q2(τ |0, pt0, x)].
4 Empirical results of bounds analysis
4.1 Duration analysis
In this subsection, we report empirical findings of bounds analysis, applied to un-
employment durations. We first begin with our main findings by describing bounds
for the treatment effects in terms of survival probability. We focus on married males
because this group is largest and effects of the reform on females may be distorted
by other factors such as introduction of parental leave benefits and higher labour
force participation of the females.
Top panels of Figure 3 show bounds with UPIT for married males with low pre-
unemployment wages and bottom panels show those with high pre-unemployment
wages.18 Bootstrap 5 % quantiles of lower bounds and bootstrap 95 % quantiles of
upper bounds are also shown along with bounds estimates in Figure 3.19 It can be
seen that for married males with high pre-unemployment earnings, the bootstrap 5
% quantiles of lower bounds (in terms of both lˆ(y|x) and l˜(y|x)) are above zero when
the unemployment duration is between 400 and 600 days. In view of the fact that
treatment takes place between 365 and 660 days, this provides strong evidence on
the significant positive treatment effect.20 On the other hand, there is little evidence
18In addition to Figure 3, see Figure 7 in the Appendix for estimation results for married males.
19The number of bootstrap repetitions is 5,000. In each repetition, we resample data nonpara-
metrically in each data cell and estimate the four survivor functions. This bootstrap procedure
insures that we always have enough data points to estimate the survivor functions.
20When we use a pooled sample for the married males we cannot identify a positive treatment
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on the existence of a treatment effect for married males with low pre-unemployment
earnings.21 This supports our conjecture that the treatment is weak or even not
present for this group.22
Now we consider bounds with UBJ proxy. The estimated bounds with UBJ
proxy are wide (see Figure 7 in the Appendix). A positive treatment effect is not
detectable for either group. We conclude that UBJ proxy does not provide enough
identification power. Therefore, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) cannot draw strong
conclusions as to whether the unemployed increased the length of search periods in
response to the reform.
In addition, we report estimation results of quantile treatment effects. Figure
5 in the Appendix shows bounds of quantile treatment effects with UPIT proxy
for married males. Again there is little evidence of the existence of the quantile
treatment effect for married males with low pre-unemployment wages, while we can
find evidence of the positive treatment effect at the upper quantiles for those with
high pre-unemployment wages.
Finally, we report estimation results for other demographic groups briefly. For
singles and females the results are often less clear. We find relatively weak positive
treatment effects in terms of both the survivor function and quantiles for single
females.23 For single males (see figure 6) and married females, we find little evidence
effect, since the group with high pre unemployment earnings is rather small (see figure 7). However,
we made an interesting observation when we increased the set of post reform years until 1994. For
the group of married males with high pre-unemployment income, the positive treatment effect
persists after the end of the treatment. It starts shortly after the beginning of the treatment and
it reduces until the end of the treatment. However, after the end of the treatment the effect rises
again. This could be due to the cumulative effect of the reform. However, it might be the case
that something else was going on, e.g. worsening labour market conditions for very long-term
unemployed married males aged 44-48 or it might also be some sort of early retirement.
21In the top panels of Figure 3, we can see that the distance between the lower and upper bounds
is broader than the gap between the estimates and their bootstrap quantiles. This suggests that
in our empirical analysis, partial identification due to missing information on the unemployment
duration is a much more fundamental issue than random sampling errors.
22This result suggests in addition that there is no general worsening of labour market conditions
for older employees during this period. This supports the conclusions of Fitzenberger and Wilke
(2004) who use the full sample of the older unemployed.
23Caution is required when explaining the results for women because they are distorted by some
factors such as the introduction of parental leave benefits and higher employment participation of
females. Estimations are not conditional on the level of the former wage because the data contains
too few single females with high pre-unemployment wages.
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on the existence of a treatment effect. Surprisingly, even for single males with
high pre-unemployment earnings we do not observe a positive treatment effect and
therefore results for the pooled sample are presented.24 Results for the married
females are not reported here, but they are available on request.25 As already
outlined by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) we do not observe that many unemployed
persons wait until they have exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefits
before they accept a new job. Otherwise results would be clearer.26 The sample size
of the group with a positive treatment effect is small compared to all unemployment
spells (less than 15%) (see table 4). This implies that the treatment effect is small
for the full population. Note that a very large share of the unemployment spells
in Germany are due to seasonal unemployment, temporary lay-offs or individuals
with short employment spells before unemployment (up to 50%). These spells are
excluded from our sample because such unemployed persons are not entitled to long
lasting UB transfers. We also did some estimations for this group and did not find
any remarkable changes for the treatment group. This supports the idea that there
is no general worsening of the labour market situation for those in their mid forties.
If there is a general worsening in labour market conditions for older employees, this
would cause an upward bias in estimated reform effects. Thus, the true reform effect
could be even smaller.
4.2 Inflow to unemployment
It is also possible to bound changes in the age group compositions of inflow to
unemployment.27 This allows us to detect whether the lay-off behaviour of the firms
has been changed by the reform. In this subsection we may expect significant changes
in respect of the inflow to unemployment just for that subpopulation who increased
unemployment duration in response to the reform. For this reason we restrict the
analysis to the married males with low or high pre-unemployment earnings. We
use the number of positive UPIT durations as the lower bound for the inflow to
unemployment and all NE durations as the upper bound.
Table 3 presents the resulting bounds for the specific sample of married males
24Figures for samples conditional on the pre-unemployment wage level are available on request.
25Bounds cross or they are even reversed. There is no clear calendar time trend. Results jump
between the years.
26An exception to this is married males with high pre-unemployment earnings.
27Details of how to bound these can be found in the Appendix A.I.
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with high or low pre-unemployment income. Apart from the combination p0 = 1981
and p1 = 1988 we do not observe an increase in the number of spells in the treatment
group both for low and high pre-unemployment earnings. It is difficult to draw a
conclusion from this figure but it seems that there is no systematic increase due to
the reform, since the low earners’ group is affected in the same way.28 This part does
not provide evidence for change in lay-off behaviour due to the reform. Observed
changes are likely due to other reasons, e.g. the business cycle, changes in the labour
force participation rate or changes in the demographic structure.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a detailed nonparametric analysis of effects due to changes in
the German unemployment compensation system using extensive register data. We
exploit the extreme richness of the data and avoid parametric assumptions. Under
mild conditions for our econometric framework we address the important problem
of missing information in the data by bounding reform effects according to what
the data provide in terms of identification power. Surprisingly, we find that partial
identification is a more serious problem than random sampling errors. We consider
bounds for changes in the inflow and in the duration of unemployment for the
treatment group aged 44-48 relative to the control group aged 36-41. There is some
evidence for the past two decades that the unemployment rate of the treatment
group continuously rose relative to the control group (see figure 4). Lu¨demann et
al. (2004) do not observe an increase in unemployment duration for the 26-41 age
group during recent decades despite a nearly doubling of the total unemployment
rate during this period.
In our analysis we do not find any evidence to indicate that the relative increase
in the unemployment rate of the 44-48 age group is mainly due to longer search peri-
ods of the unemployed in response to longer entitlement periods for unemployment
benefits since the mid 1980s. We also do not observe a general worsening of the
labour market conditions for the 44-48 age group since the unemployment durations
did not uniformly elongate in all cells of the population. However, there is some
evidence for an increase in the length of unemployment duration due to the reform.
28We can support our view that the reform did not systematically change the lay-off behaviour
of firms by providing the inflow bounds for other groups on request. For other treatment groups
we even observe a continuous compositional decrease in the inflow to unemployment.
18
This can be observed for specific subsamples of the data which amount to less than
15% of the treated unemployment spells only. In particular we detect a systematic
increase in unemployment spells lasting between 365 and 660 days for the married
males with high pre-unemployment income and for single females. In several data
cells we also identify a general increase in the highest quantiles of the unemployment
duration distribution, i.e. after two years of unemployment and later. This rise in
the length of very long-term unemployment (after several years) is likely to make a
substantial contribution to the increase in the unemployment rate for this group but
this was not subject to detailed investigation in this paper. However, the increase in
extreme long- term unemployment may be related to early retirement programmes
that were conducted during the period under consideration. It is an interesting
topic for future research.29 We do not identify a systematic increase in the inflow to
unemployment for the group of unemployed who increased search periods after the
reform. However, detailed investigation of this has not been covered in this paper
and will need to be the subject of future research.
The recent reform of the German unemployment compensation system lead to
the merger of UA, IMT and social benefits by the year 2005. The so called new
social benefits (Arbeitslosengeld II) is means tested and it is generally at the level
of welfare, i.e. it is independent of pre-unemployment income. In light of the future
reform in 2006 this suggests that the decrease in the maximum entitlement length for
UB will have a stronger effect on individuals with high pre-unemployment earnings
than found in this paper. This is because the decline in the level of income transfers
will be higher than in the old system with UA. However, the size of this group is
pretty small compared to the total population of unemployed persons. We therefore
conclude that the effect of the reform on population average search periods will be
rather limited. However, as shown by Kyyra¨ and Wilke (2004) for Finland it will
lead to an effective reduction in early retirement for individuals aged 55 or above.
29In our estimations with post reform years up to 1994 we find that the increase in very long
term unemployment is much stronger during the years 1991-1994.
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Figure 3: UPIT: lˆ(y|x), uˆ(y|x) (left) and l˜(y|x), u˜(y|x) (right) for low (top) and
high (bottom) pre unemployment wages. Sample restricted to married males.
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Figure 4: Evolution of unemployment rates (left) and difference in unemployment
rates of treated and untreated (right). Source: IAB Nuremberg, own calculations
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Appendix:
A I: Bounding changes in the age group composition of the
inflow to unemployment
Let N(t, p, x) denote the inflow to unemployment for age group T = t in time
period P = p conditional on X = x. Since we only observe interval data on the
duration variable Y , N(t, p, x) is unobserved. However, as before, we can bound
N(t, p, x) in the following way. On one hand, for Y2 (the upper bound of Y , in our
applications Y2 = NE), we can compute the inflow to Y2, denoted by N2(t, p, x).
Notice N(t, p, x) ≤ N2(t, p, x) since Y2 may contain spells other than unemployment
durations. On the other hand, for Y1 (the lower bound of Y , in our applications
Y1 = UBJ or UPIT), we can compute the inflow to strictly positive Y1, denoted by
N1(t, p, x). Notice that N1(t, p, x) ≤ N(t, p, x) since positive Y1 may not contain all
unemployment spells. Also, notice that we consider the inflow to only positive Y1
since the inflow to all Y1 equals the inflow to Y2.
We define the effect of a reform on the age group composition of the inflow
to unemployment using the difference-in-differences (DID) framework. Specifically,
the effect of a reform on the age group composition of the inflow to unemployment
(denoted by C(x, pt0, pt1)) is defined as
C(x, pt0, pt1) = [N(1, pt1, x)−N(0, pt1, x)]− [N(1, pt0, x)−N(0, pt0, x)]. (12)
Notice that the identification region for N(t, p, x)
N1(t, p, x) ≤ N(t, p, x) ≤ N2(t, p, x) (13)
for t = 0, 1 and p = pt0, pt1. Since there are no cross restrictions over time periods
and age groups, equation (13) implies that C(x, pt0, pt1) is bounded by an interval
with endpoints [lC(x, pt0, pt1), uC(x, pt0, pt1)]:
lC(x, pt0, pt1) = {N1(1, pt1, x)−N2(0, pt1, x)}
− {N2(1, pt0, x)−N1(0, pt0, x)} (14)
and
uC(x, pt0, pt1) = {N2(1, pt1, x)−N1(0, pt1, x)}
− {N1(1, pt0, x)−N2(0, pt0, x)}. (15)
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A II: Tables
Table 1: Descriptive summary of the sample: pre reform years
aged 36-41 aged 44-48
(control group) (treatment group)
number of spells 3,694 2,872
mean/median spell length UBJ 114/25 111/25
mean/median spell length UPIT 222/112 235/121
mean/median spell length NE 581/243 554/248
censored (UPIT) 27% 30%
censored (NE) 15% 21%
female 40% 38%
married 81% 82%
low wage (0− 60%) 75% 77%
high wage (60− 100%) 25% 23%
mean age (in years) 38.6 45.8
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Table 2: Descriptive summary of the sample: post reform years
aged 36-41 aged 44-48
(control group) (treatment group)
number of spells 1,764 1,301
mean/median spell length UBJ 119/21 111/4
mean/median spell length UPIT 212/114 248/122
mean/median spell length NE 476/273 549/304
censored (UPIT) 27% 28%
censored (NE) 15% 23%
female 46% 47%
married 71% 70%
low wage (0− 60%) 78% 75%
high wage (60− 100%) 22% 25%
mean age (in years) 38.3 46.1
Table 3: Changes in inflow to unemployment, sample restricted to married males
1981 1982 1983
lc uc lc uc lc uc
1987 low wage -51 231 -87 250 -124 189
high wage -53 235 -138 224 -210 131
1988 low wage 33 297 -3 316 -40 255
high wage 29 298 -56 287 -128 194
Table 4: Number of spells in the sample, proportion of samples with positive treat-
ment effect
pre reform years post reform years
Full sample IABS
aged 36-41 6,609 3,880
aged 44-48 5,287 3,021
Sample with positive treatment effect:
married males with high income transfers or single females
aged 36-41 862 (13%) 434 (11%)
aged 44-48 651 (12%) 334 (11%)
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A III: Figures
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Figure 5: UPIT, sample restricted to married males. l˜q(τ |x), u˜q(τ |x) for low (left)
and high (right) pre unemployment wages.
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Figure 6: UPIT, sample restricted to single males (left) or single females (right):
l˜(y|x), u˜(y|x) (top) and and l˜q(τ |x), u˜q(τ |x) (bottom).
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Figure 7: lˆ(y|x), uˆ(y|x) (left) and l˜(y|x), u˜(y|x) (right) for UPIT (top) and UBJ
(bottom). Sample restricted to married males.
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